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Abstract 
This paper utilizes field and laboratory experiments to test the use of a provision point 
mechanism to finance renewable energy programs, commonly known as green pricing programs. 
In contrast to most green pricing programs, relatively high participation is found in the field, 
while laboratory results suggest that demand revelation is achieved by the mechanism in a single 
shot environment with a large group of potential participants. 
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1. Introduction 
Despite market research that has unifonnly predicted substantial customer interest in 
paying higher electric power rates to support renewable energy generation and environmental 
programs, experience with green pricing indicates that participation levels have not exceeded 1 to 
2 percent (Byrnes et al., 1995; Farhar and Houston, 1996).3 Three explanations for this 
discrepancy seem possible. First, hypothetical market research studies of program support may 
have been upwardly biased. Second, most utility customers may have been unaware of such 
programs, in spite of attempts by electric utilities to infonn them using bill inserts, mailed 
brochures and advertising. Note that market research, by necessarily infonning customers of a 
potential green pricing program, inherently creates perfect awareness concerning the program in 
the sample population. As a result, forecasts derived from market research depend critically on 
assumptions about customer awareness which in turn depend on the effectiveness of marketing. 
A third possibility is that actual customer participation in green programs may have been lowered 
by free-riding, because participation has commonly been structured as a charitable voluntary 
contribution. 
From the viewpoint of economics, the possibility of free riding in actual participation is 
of primary concern. Provision point mechanisms have been shown to have desirable theoretical 
properties (Bagnoli and Lipman, 1989) and to substantially reduce free riding in experimental 
tests when compared to the voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM) (Isaac, Schmidtz, and 
Walker, 1989; Suleiman and Rapoport, 1992; Dawes, Orbell, Simmons, and van de Kragt, 1986). 
There are also anecdotal reports of provision points being used to successfully resolve actual free 
riding problems (Bagnoli and McKee, 1991). Motivated in part by this literature, as well as by 
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recent utility industry interest in voluntarily funded green power programs, this paper reports the 
results of a paired field and laboratory experimental application of a provision point mechanism 
using a green pricing program implemented by Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation. Both 
theoretical and experimental economists have long hoped for a practical mechanism for the 
private funding of public goods (see for example Groves and Ledyard, 1977; Smith, 1980). This 
research is designed to test whether this goal can be realized given our current understanding of 
public good mechanisms. 
In Section 2 we provide the specifics of the Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation 
GreenChoice™ program and the provision point mechanism l;lsed. The third section describes 
the field experiment and estimates a random utility model of actual program participation on the 
basis of individual characteristics. The primary advantage of the field experiment is that, by 
phoning customers, describing the GreenChoice™ program, and allowing them to sign-up or 
decline the offering on the phone, complete awareness is assured in the sample population. In 
spite of this control, it is still uncertain whether the sign-up rates observed in the field experiment 
(which are much higher than those of previous programs using voluntary contributions) reflect 
actual demand or if free-riding problems remain. Thus, in Section 4, we replicate the Niagara 
Mohawk Power Corporation mechanism in an induced value laboratory experiment under the 
assumption that, if the mechanism fails to eliminate free riding in the laboratory, then it will fail 
to eliminate free riding in the field. The hypothesis that this provision point mechanism 
eliminates free riding and induces demand-revealing behavior is tested by comparing individual 
• 
and group contributions relative to induced values.4 A random utility model is used to predict 
the probability of participation, but now as a function of induced value. Finally, Section 5 
3 
presents our conclusions concerning use of provision points for the private provision of public 
goods and discusses remaining issues. 
2. The Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation GreenChoice™ Program 
The Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (NMPC), a public utility in New York State, 
sought to accelerate the development of renewable energy sources of electricity by offering its 
customers "green rates" as proposed by Moskovitz (1992, 1993). Moskovitz argued that 
customers would voluntarily sign up and agree to pay higher electricity rates if the additional 
money collected were earmarked to support renewable energy projects or other environmental 
activities. Economists were quick to point out that the selection of such a rate by a customer 
would be a charitable contribution since the mechanism proposed by Moskovitz would allow free 
riding (see Schulze, 1994).5 NMPC in tum developed the GreenChoice™ program, using a 
modified contribution mechanism in an attempt to reduce free-riding incentives. 
The mechanism adopted by NMPC employed three features that have been tested in the 
experimental literature. First, it contained a provision point of $864,000 to be raised through 
customer contributions. This minimum level of funding would provide for the construction of a 
renewable energy facility to serve 1,200 homes, and for the planting of 50,000 trees in the NMPC 
service area. The addition of a provision point to a voluntary contribution mechanism adds 
multiple, efficient Nash equilibria at the threshold, and has been shown to increase individual 
pledges towards the provision of public goods. Unfortunately, if the threshold is not met, a 
provision point results in a complete loss of efficiency, unlike the VCM (Isaac, Schmidtz and 
Walker, 1989). 
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Second, NMPC's funding mechanism offered a money back guarantee to customers 
which assured them that, if contributions failed to reach the threshold, all money collected would 
be refunded. The money-back guarantee provided insurance to potential contributors against the 
risk of losing their contributions should the provision point not be met. In experiments where 
subjects can contribute all or none of their endowment to a public good, Dawes et al. (1986) find 
no evidence to support the use of a money-back guarantee. However, in an environment where 
subjects can contribute any amount, Isaac, Schmidtz, and Walker (1989) report that the guarantee 
significantly increases contributions. 
Third, the mechanism offered the possibility of extended benefits. Money collected in 
excess of the provision point would be used to extend benefits, or increase the production of the 
public good. Here, excess contributions were to be used to increase the number of homes served 
with renewable energy or to plant more trees. Extending benefits beyond the provision point 
does not modify individual incentives in theory, but simply creates a VCM environment beyond 
the threshold (Marks and Croson, 1996). Marks and Croson refers to this use of excess 
contributions as a "utilization rebate" rule. In evaluating alternative rebate rules for provision 
point mechanisms experimentally, Marks and Croson finds that offering extended benefits has 
the greatest positive effect upon group contributions. 
One theoretically undesirable feature ofNMPC's mechanism was that, to legally qualify 
as a rate offering, the program could only be offered at a posted price. Thus, customers could 
choose only to contribute a fixed amount of $6.00 per month or not participate at all. A posted 
-

price is undesirable because it does not allow households to self-select a monthly fee that better 
represents their preferences for the program. Note that, despite the posted price, the mechanism 
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does not reduce to a referendum, because the only individuals to pay are those who choose to 
participate. 
illterestingly, the only other green pricing programs to use a provision point mechanism 
of which we are aware were fully subscribed. Traverse City Light and Power attempted and 
completed a windmill project using a funding mechanism similar to NMPC's, except that it did 
not offer extended benefits. Participation was instead curtailed after the program's provision 
point was successfully reached with 200 customers at an estimated residential premium of $7.58 
per month (23 percent of the average residential bill) (Holt and Associates, 1996a). The City of 
Fort Collins also used a series of provision points to solicit funds for up to three separate wind 
turbines. (Holt and Associates, 1996b). To date, enough customers have agreed to pay an 
estimated average premium of $10 per month to exceed the minimum provision point established 
to fund two turbines (Clements-Grote, 1997; Holt and Associates, 1997). 
ill comparing these offerings with the GreenChoice™ program it is important to note that 
there are substantial differences in magnitude and scope. Both the Fort Collins and Traverse City 
programs were small, locally based programs able to focus on well-defined projects, so that 
awareness was easily achieved. In contrast, the NMPC program, although initially intended to be 
offered only in the Buffalo area, had to be offered, for legal reasons, to NMPC's entire service 
area, which covers well over fifty percent of the area of New York State. Thus, marketing 
became a major impediment to the program. 
Unfortunately, though the GreenChoice™ program was formally approved by the New 
York Public Service Commission, it was ultimately suspended before completion because NMPC 
developed serious financial difficulties and was unable to promote customer awareness of the 
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program. Before suspension, the program was briefly mentioned in a bill insert and described 
in a brochure sent to about three percent of NMPC's customers. Most of the planned marketing 
campaign, including a substantial advertising budget and tree plantings at public schools 
throughout the service territory, was canceled. Before the program was terminated, however, we 
were able to conduct a field experiment with NMPC customers. 
3. Field Experiment 
3.1. Experimental Design 
The field experiment was conducted as part of a larger National Science 
FoundationlEnvironmental Protection Agency research effort to investigate environmental values 
for public programs (Poe, Clark, and Schulze, 1997). A telephone survey was utilized to attempt 
to contact a random sample of 206 households in the Buffalo area.6 The telephone survey began 
by screening customers to identify the person in the household who usually pays the NMPC 
electric bill. Once that person is on the phone, the interviewer describes the purpose of the 
survey and the sponsors of the study. The individual is then asked to rate NMPC's service. This 
allows the small number of dissatisfied customers to vent frustration before answering the 
remaining questions. Customer awareness of the GreenChoice™ program is obtained next, and 
then the goals of the program are described in tum. As the goals are described, the respondent is 
asked: 
How interested are you in the goal of replacing fossil energy with renewable energy 
sources? On a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 is not at all interested and lOis very 
interested, how interested are you? 
and later: 
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, ' 
How interested are you in the goal ofplanting trees on public lands in upstate New York? 
As before on a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 is not at all interested and 10 is very 
interested, how interested are you? 
The funding plan is then described as follows: 
The GreenChoice program would be funded voluntarily. Customers who decide to join 
the program would pay an additional fixed fee of$6 per month on their NMPC bill. This 
fee would not be tax deductible. Customers would sign up or cancel at any time. While 
customers sign up, NMPC would askfor bids on renewable energy projects. Enough 
customers would have to become GreenChoice partners to pay for the program. For 
example if 12,000 customers joined the first year, they would invest $864,000, which 
would allow Niagara Mohawk to plant 50,000 trees and fund a landfill gas project. The 
gas project could replace allfossilfuel electricity in 1,200 homes. However, if after one
 
year, participation were insufficient to fund GreenChoice activities, Niagara Mohawk
 
would cancel the program and refund all the money that was collected.
 
The program description was taken more or less directly from the program brochure prepared by 
NMPC. Note that NMPC was deliberately vague about the exact level of the provision because 
the renewable energy project was to be sent for competitive bid. 
The survey then asks respondents whether the features of the funding program make them 
more or less interested in the program (see section 3.2 for details). This is followed by the 
participation question. It is phrased as follows: 
You may need a moment to 'consider the next couple of questions. Given your
 
household's income and expenses, I'd like you to think about whether or not you would
 
be interested in the GreenChoice program. If you decide to sign up, we will send your 
name to Niagara Mohawk, and get you enrolled in the program. All your other answers
 
to this survey will remain confidential. Does your household want to sign up for the
 
program at a cost of $6.00 per month? 
Although actual monies were never collected because the program was suspended, this sign up 
now/pay later approach corresponds with the following stepwise process typically used in green 
pricing programs: 1) potential projects are described; 2) subscriptions from customers are elicited 
•
through direct marketing, bill inserts and advertising; and 3) money is collected through regular 
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billing. Experience from the Traverse City project suggests that the payment to intention ratio is 
very high--in that case, Traverse City Light and Power found that approximately 5% of those 
who originally signed-up reneged. 
The survey ends with socioeconomic questions useful for modeling demand. 
3.2. Results and Analysis 
Of the sample of 206 households, contact was made with 179.7 Of these, 34 refused to 
participate and three could not complete the questionnaire. Thus, 142 respondents completed the 
survey, yielding a response rate of 69% of the base sample. Of the 142,29 signed up for the 
program, resulting in a participation rate of 20.5 percent. Ifwe assume that the 37 households 
who refused or could not complete the survey would also have refused the program, the 
. participation rate would fall to 16.5 percent. Both these estimates stand in marked contrast to the 
actual sign-up rate of less than 0.1 percent observed by NMPC throughout the period 
GreenChoice™ was offered. As discussed previously, this low participation was likely caused 
by the minimal marketing and low customer awareness of the progr'lm. Indeed, none of the 142 
randomly sampled respondents in our survey recalled having heard about the program. 
Participation rates of 16.5 and 20.5 percent are consistent with a preliminary market evaluation 
of the NMPC service area conducted by the Research Triangle Institute (RTD (Wood et al. 
1994), which estimated that with full awareness there was a 17 percent probability of adopting a 
green planting program at a $6 monthly premium. The RTI data were taken from a sample that 
-

over sampled "green" customers, since such customers were regarded as the target group for an 
actual program. Based on prior information, approximately 25 percent of urban NMPC 
9 
customers were classified as "green". 
It is important to note that a participation rate of 16%-20% is, however, substantially 
higher than the 1% needed to fund GreenChoice™ (12,000 of a total of 1.2 million NMPC 
I . 
customers), and those observed in the majority of actual green pricing experiments reported in 
the literature (Baugh et ai. 1995; Brynes et ai. 1995; Holt and Associates, 1996; Farhar and 
Houston 1996). As suggested earlier, however, there are notable differences between our 
experiment and the majority of previous studies. First, reported participation rate estimates have 
not generally been adjusted to account for program awareness, which was controlled in our study 
at 100 percent. Instead, participation rates have typically been defined over total customer base 
or over the base of customers targeted with direct mailings. Previous participation experiments 
have also (with the two exceptions noted previously) relied on voluntary contributions rather than 
the provision point mechanism used here. 
To investigate individual specific factors associated with participation decisions, the 
linear logistic distribution, which can be derived from a random utility model (McFadden, 1976), 
is assumed to characterize individual decisions, 
(1)	 Pr{"Yes" response} = __:;.,.1 _ 
1 + e-aX 
where X depicts a vector of covariates characterizing individuals and their perceptions of the 
program (including a constant term), and ~ is the corresponding set of coefficients to be 
estimated. 
Assuming this logistic distribution, participation decisions are modeled as a function of 
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three categories of covariates elicited in the questionnaire. The first concerns respondents' 
perceptions of the program's worth. Respondents registered their interest in the twin goals of the 
GreenChoice™ program -- replacing fossil fuels and planting trees in upstate New York -- using 
a scale of one ("not at all interested") to 10 ("very interested") for each goal.8 It is expected that 
the sign on these variable would be positively correlated with the probability of joining the 
program. 
The second category of covariates includes variables specific to the respondent, such as 
sex (Male=1), age (Years), education (College Graduate or higher =1), and recent financial 
support of environmental groups (Yes= I). Such characteristics are widely used as explanatory 
covariates in the environmental valuation literature. Based on this literature, it is expected that 
age will be negatively correlated with WTP while recent financial support for environmental 
groups would be positively correlated with joining the program. The other variables have 
provided mixed results in the literature. As noted earlier, individual perceptions of NMPC 
service were elicited using a one ("unfavorable") to 10 ("very favorable") scale and included as 
a covariate in this analysis. 
The final category of covariates concerns respondents' perceptions of the provision point 
mechanism itself. After hearing of the funding provision point and money back guarantee, 
respondents were asked the following two questions: 
Does the fact that a minimum level ofcustomer participation is required for GreenChoice
 
to operate make the program of less interest to you, more interest, or does it not affect
 
your interest?
 
• 
Does the fact that Niagara Mohawk would refund all the money it collects -- if support is
 
insufficient -- make GreenChoice of less interest to you, more interest, or does it not
 
affect your interest in the program?
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These variables are admittedly ad hoc, in the sense they do not proxy for the value of the 
program. However, they do provide infonnation about perceptions regarding specific 
components of the provision point mechanism. Over 55 percent responded that their interest was 
not affected by including a provision point and about 16 and 27 percent indicated that it 
increased or decreased their interest in the program, respectively. In contrast, the money back 
guarantee was widely favored: only 9 percent of respondents indicated that this attribute reduced 
their interest in the program, while 46 percent indicated that it increased their interest. For the 
purpose of modeling the participation decision, these response categories were re-coded as binary 
variables assigned '1' if the "more interest" option was selected, and zero otherwise. We expect 
their estimated coefficients to be positive. 
The logit model of program participation is reported in Table 1, together with the sample 
means, standard deviations, and the expected signs of the estimated coefficients of all the 
explanatory variables described above. Given the single $6 threshold, the estimation results are 
fairly strong: 80 percent of the responses are correctly predicted and the overall likelihood greatly 
exceeds the critical value (LR=31.03 > 14.68 = X2o.lo(9». 
Considered jointly, the estimated coefficients on the two program goals are significant 
using a likelihood ratio test (LR = 7.23> 4.61 = X20.IO(2», leading to the conclusion that there is a 
positive response to the tree-planting and renewable energy objectives of the NMPC program. 
Comparison of the individual coefficient estimates suggests that, in spite of the observation that 
more people favored the tree planting objective, interest in fossil fuel replacement is a more 
significant predictor of participation decisions. The implication is that tree programs will have 
broad based general support, but that interest in the fossil fuel component will be the significant 
12 
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Table 1. Estimated Logit Models of NMPC Phone Participants 
Variable Mean Estimated Coefficients Expected Sign 
-4.386 
(2.184)"0 
n.a. 
0.2336.27 + 00(0.118(2.82 
0.2168.35 + 
(2.18) 0.186) 
0.9540.46 ? 
(0.50) (0.517)" 
55.09 -0.0396 
(0.0192)"0(15.70 
0.19 0.666+ 
(0.39) (0.624) 
0.002 
0.50) 
0.45 +? 
(0.546 
8.49 0.082+? 
(1.67) 0.644
 
Min. Participation
 0.17 1.416
 
[More Interested =1]
 
+ 
(0.588)"0
 
Money Back Guarantee
 
(0.38) 
0.47 -0.098
 
[More Interested =1]
 
+ 
0.50) (0.550
 
n
 128
 
Likelihood Ratio
 00031.03

Percent Correct! Predicted 80
 
Numbers in 0 are standard errors . 
•,.*, and "'** indicate significance levels of 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively. 
explanatory factor in participation decisions. This finding is consistent with the NMPC market 
research (Wood et ai., 1994). 
A joint test of the null hypothesis that restricts all demographic coefficients to zero was 
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rejected at the 10 percent level (LR =10.28> 9.24 =X20.1O(5)). The estimated coefficients on 
respondent attributes vary in significance, consistent with other studies in the environmental 
valuation literature. Age was negatively correlated with participation, a factor that may be 
attributed to the life cycle hypothesis of value in which potential use values decline with age 
(Cropper and Sussman, 1990). This negative relation may also be associated with the fact that 
age is also inversely correlated with income in this data set.9 The finding that male respondents 
had a higher likelihood of participation contrasts with evidence suggesting that this variable is 
not substantially related to environmental concerns (Van Liere and Dunlap, 1980). The 
coefficients on the other socio-demographic covariates were not significantly different from zero. 
From our perspective, the coefficients on the funding mechanism variables are of 
considerable interest, despite their ad hoc nature. Considered jointly, these variables are 
significant ((LR = 5.84 > 4.61 = X20.1O(2)). In particular, interest in the provision point mechanism 
is a significant, and positive, explanatory variable in participation decision. The minority of 
respondents with interest in that feature clearly had a higher participation rate, suggesting that 
addition of this feature increases the likelihood of funding. In contrast, interest in the money 
back guarantee is not a significant explanatory variable in the estimated model in spite of the fact 
that there appears to be a widespread interest in the money back guarantee. 
In summary, modeling of participation decisions indicates that the content and structural 
attributes of the NMPC mechanism are influential in participation decisions. The program goals 
of replacing fossil fuel energy and planting tree are important to participation decisions, 
particularly the former. In addition, the provision point feature increases participation. 
14 
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4. Laboratory Experiment 
4.1. Experimental Design 
The provision point mechanism adopted by NMPC appears, given the field experiment 
results, to yield a high participation rate with full consumer awareness. In addition, there seems 
to be a consistent relationship between individuals' stated preferences and program involvement. 
Nevertheless, without direct knowledge of individual valuations, we have no way of knowing 
how successful the mechanism is in eliminating free riding or if the mechanism is demand 
revealing. A laboratory experiment was thus designed to test this funding mechanism in an 
environment where program values could be induced. If this ,mechanism fails to eliminate free 
riding in the laboratory, then we would expect it to fail to eliminate free riding in the field. Note 
that provision point mechanisms theoretically have Nash equilibria where costs are just covered 
by contributions. Often, in laboratory experiments with small groups, subjects just miss the 
provision point by slight under-contribution, a behavior termed "cheap riding" (Bagnoli and 
Lipman, 1989). In contrast, there is some evidence that large groups reveal demand when faced 
with a single shot provision point mechanism (see discussion next p,aragraph). 
This section describes a classroom laboratory experiment specifically designed to 
evaluate the demand revelation properties of the NMPC mechanism. In addition to designing a 
laboratory mechanism paralleling the NMPC program, this experiment deviated from the body of 
previous public goods research in two important ways. First, in contrast to most public good 
experiments which have relied on "small groups" of less than 10 individuals, this experiment 
involved 100 participants. In part, this "large group" approach was adopted so as to more closely ­
reflect the NMPC field conditions. The decision to use large groups was also based on 
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experimental findings of Isaac, Walker and Williams (1994) that individuals in groups of 40 and 
100 contributed significantly more to a VCM public good experiment than did subjects in small 
groups (n=4 and 10). Experimental results reported in Rondeau, Schulze, and Poe (1996) further 
suggest that a provision point mechanism using a proportional rebate conducted in a large group 
(n=45) setting approximates demand revelation in the aggregate while the same mechanism 
results in under-revelation in small groups (n=6). A second manner in which the analysis of the 
experiment contrasts with previous public goods research is that it models individual 
contribution decisions in a random utility framework. 
The experiment was performed in an undergraduate economics principles class. The 
students had experience in market experiments but not in public goods experiments. An 
experiment "in decision-making" was introduced at the beginning of a regularly scheduled class, 
and printed instructions were distributed after students were seated. Students were instructed to 
copy the subject number written on their instructions onto a blank envelope which they were also 
provided. Students read their instructions (see sample in Appendix A), after which a brief oral 
summary was given. Questions were answered privately by monitors. Students were then 
allowed approximately ten minutes to make a decision which shall be described shortly. They 
then sealed their instructions and decision responses in their envelopes. Follow-up questions 
were distributed immediately afterward, and subject numbers were copied from the envelopes to 
follow-up questionnaires. All materials were collected after the follow-up forms were 
completed. The sealed envelopes ensured that students could not alter their decisions after 
answering the follow-up questions. Students were not allowed to communicate during the 
experiment. 
16 
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The nature of the decision was as follows. Each participant was given a starting balance 
of $5 and the opportunity to join a group investment program for a one-time fixed fee of $3. 
Before a participant decided whether or not to join, the group investment program and payoff 
calculations were described. The group investment program would yield a return only if 40% or 
more of the participants joined. Each participant was informed that they would receive their pre­
specified "return" if this provision point was met or exceeded regardless of whether or not they 
had joined. Each subject was randomly assigned to a return from the set {$0.50, $1.75, $3.00, 
$4.25, $5.50}. Twenty subjects were assigned to each "return" and subjects were told their own 
return but were not made aware of the returns of other subjects. These returns were the induced 
values, designed to reflect the heterogeneous values NMPC customers hold for the 
GreenChoice™ program. Ifmore than 40% joined, each participant also received a fixed "bonus 
payment" of 3¢ for each participant that joined in excess of the provision point. If fewer than 
40% joined, the group investment program was canceled and all contributions were refunded. 
The bonus payment was public information. 
The fixed participation fee was selected in conjunction with the induced values to insure 
that 1) the average payoff would equal or slightly exceed the participation fee and that 2) the total 
group benefits would equal or exceed twice the total group cost if the provision point were met 
or exceeded. Total costs (TC) and benefits (TB) are illustrated in Figure 1 for a group of 100 
participants. This sample size was chosen to correspond with a large group setting, and to enable 
statistical analysis. The investment return values were chosen to be symmetric around the fixed 
• 
fee and, based on pre-test results, to vary sufficiently to identify any relationship between 
induced value and participation for this sample size. 
17 
I 
Figure 1: Total Costs and Benefits 
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The bonus mechanism was incorporated to reflect NMPC's offer of extended benefits 
financed by funds in excess of the provision point. The bonus amount of 3¢ was chosen so as to 
equate the aggregate group marginal benefits and marginal costs, as shown in Figure 1. The 
,instructions were worded so as to avoid intrinsic value associated with program context; we 
sought to isolate the effectiveness of the mechanism alone in reducing free-riding behavior. 
Though this removed an important aspect of realism associated with NMPC's GreenChoice™ 
program, it allows for an unbiased evaluation of the program's financing mechanism. Finally, 
follow-up questions were posed to collect additional information on the participation decision 
(see Appendix B). The questions attempted to measure self interest and altruistic factors that 
might exogenously enter into participation decisions. 
In summary, this experiment was designed to test the "naive" hypothesis that the 
provision point mechanism used by NMPC induces demand-revealing behavior under laboratory 
conditions. That is, we test if subjects with induced values above a posted price contribute and 
those with induced values below the posted price do not. If the mechanism is perfectly demand 
revealing, 50% of the 100 subjects should choose to participate in the program at a cost of $3, 
given the distribution of induced values: the 40% with induced values less than $3 should not 
sign up, the 40% with induced values exceeding $3 should sign up, and the 20% with the $3 
induced value should be indifferent between joining and not joining. If, like the voluntary 
contribution mechanism, the provision point features fail to induce participation to levels 
approximating demand revelation, then we would expect that the results of the field experiment 
-

underestimate the "true" demand for the program. 
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4.2 Experimental Laboratory Results and Analysis 
At the aggregate level, 47 percent of the subjects chose to join the program and pay the $3 
fee, resulting in the funding of the public good. Clearly, this participation level closely 
approximates the 50 percent participation rate expected under our naive hypothesis. Thus, given 
I 
this sample design, the mechanism appears to provide an approximately demand revealing l 
i 
outcome in the aggregate. In reaching this conclusion, it is interesting to note that in the week 
following the experiment described here, the same students participated in a standard 
computerized VCM public goods experiment developed by the Economic Science Laboratory at 
the University of Arizona. The experiment was conducted (using monetary incentives) as part of 
the students' regular weekly sections held in the Laboratory for Experimental Economics and 
Decision Research at Cornell. Contributions in the first round of this multiple round experiment 
were 41 percent of the maximum possible paYoff (where the payoff corresponds to the induced 
value in the provision point experiment). 10 Thus, the subjects participating in these experiment 
appear typical, in that they exhibit substantial free-riding when in a single or initial period VCM 
environment (Davis and Holt, 1993). 
As shown in Figure 2, participation is also generally responsive to increases in induced 
return. Contrary to our naive hypothesis, however, the response proportions do not exhibit a 
sharp step at $3. And thus, demand revelation associated with this mechanism is not perfect. 
Using a random utility framework first developed by McFadden (1976), it is possible to test the 
internal consistency of participation rates observed and the hypothesis that participation rates 
increase with induced value. In this framework, it is assumed that individuals know their own 
preferences with certainty, but that they may make errors in decision-making because of 
20 
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Figure 2: Actual Joining Distribution 
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imperfect information or errors in optimization. In addition, some aspects of the individuals' 
preferences are not observable by the analyst, and treated as random. These limitations introduce 
a stochastic error component into the modeling of decisions (Maddala, 1983). 
Using such a model, we shall first specify the random utility equivalent of the naive null 
hypothesis, in which a customer will sign-up for the program at posted price $C if the utility 
associated with having the program and paying $C is greater than the utility associated with not 
having the program. If we assume that indirect utility is additively separable, the probability of a 
"yes" response to a particular posted price is then: 
(2) , Pr{"Yes" response} =Pr{V- C+€ > O} 
where V is the value or willingness to pay of an individual for the green program and E is an 
error term. Assuming that the error is logistically distributed, Equation (2) can be expressed as: 
(3) Pr{"Yes" response} =__.:...1~~:-­
1 + e-(a + P(V - c» 
where a: and Pare location and slope parameters to be estimated. The null hypothesis Hoi: a: = 
ocorresponds to the hypothesis that, at V =C, there is a 50 percent participation level. A 
positive value for a: would shift the entire distribution to the left in a manner consistent with 
over~revelation relative to induced values, while under-revelation would correspond to a: < O. 
2The null hypothesis for the slope parameter Ho : P=0 has only a one-sided alternative p> O. 
That is, we are testing the hypothesis that participation does not increase with induced value. 
Note from Equation (3) that for P> 0, the relationship between induced value and 
participation takes on an "S" shaped function through the introduction of logistically distributed 
random errors. Additionally, if a: =0, when induced value equals cost (V =C), participation is 
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50%; as V-C becomes large, participation approaches 100%; and for small V relative to C, 
participation ultimately approaches 0%. The shape, or rather steepness, of the response function 
does vary with the magnitude of p. If P=0, the probability of participation is a constant, but for 
large p, a step function is predicted. Figure 3 shows this relationship for a range of pvalues. 
Estimates of a. and pusing maximum likelihood techniques are found in the "base" 
column of Table 2. 11 Consistent with our hypotheses, a. is not significantly different from zero, 
indicating that the hypothesis of 50% participation at V-C =0 cannot be rejected statistically. In 
addition, the estimated coefficient on V-C, p, is positive and significant. This latter result 
supports the hypothesis that participation is positively correlated with induced value. In all, these 
results are consistent with the hypothesis that this mechanism is demand revealing. 
Table 2: Estimated Logit Models Using Induced Values 
Variable (coefficient) Mean Base Long(s.d.)
[Ran e] 
Constant (a.o) -0.093 -2.26 (0.537)'"'(0.211) 
Group/Self (a. l ) 0.61 3.688 (0.856)'" 
[0.14, 2.50] 
(0.44) 
Induced Return (P) 0.01 0.337 0.301 
(0.123)'" (0.143)'" 
[-2.50, 2.50] 
(1.77) 
n 98 98 
Likelihood Ratio X2 8.02'" 38.19'" 
Percent Correctl Predicted 7361 
-

*,**,*** indicate significance levels of to, 5, and I percent, respectively. 
, 
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Figure 3: Random Utility Model for Various Betas
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However, in spite of the highly significant estimation results reported in Table 2, closer 
examination of the data reveals that the model is not completely characterizing individual 
decisions. For example, as depicted in Figure 4, participation at lower values (e.g. V-C = -$2.50) 
exceeds the zero percent participation expected. There is also an obvious dip at the induced 
value of $5.50 (V-C = $2.50) The remainder of this section summarizes an exploratory 
investigation of why these deviations occur by focusing on altruistic and free-riding motivations. 
This extended analysis is intended, in part, to demonstrate the opportunities arising from a 
random utility modeling framework in future experimental economics research. The objective is 
to also provide an empirical base and motivation for future theoretical research. 
An advantage of the random utility modeling is that it can incorporate other explanatory 
variables into the error based decision framework. In an effort to account for differential, 
exogenous motives, subjects were asked to indicate the importance they attached in making their 
decision to maximizing their own earnings, and to maximizing group earnings, both on seven­
point scales (l = Not Important, 7 = Extremely Important). Each of these questions are provided 
in Appendix B. 
The self-reported interest in maximizing "group" and "self' earnings were combined in a 
"group/self" ratio so as to normalize relative responses at the individual level. In other words, a 
response pattern group=5, self=5 would be assigned a group/self ratio of I, as would the response 
pattern group=2, self=2. In terms of Equation (3), this ratio (group/self) is included by expanding 
« from a constant to a vector and treating the ratio group/self as a separate element. As such, 
argument «in Equation (3) becomes «Grand = «0 + «I*(group/self). The expectation is that 
participation is positively related to group orientation, and thus «I should be positive with a 
•
corresponding null hypothesis Ht «1=0. To account for this ratio, the null hypothesis HoI: 
«=0, must be restated as Ho4: «Grand= (ao + «I*(group/self)) = O. As before, a positive value for 
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"Grand would shift the entire distribution to the left, indicating "over-revelation" associated with 
altruism. A negative "Grand would shift the distribution to the right, providing evidence of free­
riding. 
The results from including this ratio in the estimation are provided in the "long" column 
of Table 2. Consistent with Andreoni's (1995) arguments concerning the role of altruism in 
public goods experiments, the estimated coefficient "I is positive and significant. Notably, the 
inclusion of this variable does not have a significant effect on the slope coefficient, but does 
greatly increase the explanatory power of the estimated model, as demonstrated by the jump in 
the percentage of responses correctly predicted and the likelihood ratio chi square values. Thus 
we argue that the addition of this variable makes a significant contribution to the explanatory 
power of the decision making model. 
Setting the group/own ratio at its mean (0.61), "Grand equals -0.01 (s.e. = 0.25) and is not 
significantly different from zero at any standard level of significance. As such the naive null 
hypothesis H 4: "Grand=O still cannot be rejected for the average respondent in spite of the fact that o
the individual coefficients used in calculating "Grand are each significantly different from zero. In 
other words, the altruistic behavior of subjects with induced values of $0.50, $1.75, and $3.00, as 
captured by the positive and significant "I estimate, is being canceled out by the free-riding 
behavior of subjects with the higher induced values (recall Figure 2). It is interesting to note 
however that "Grand is significantly different from zero in expected directions when the ratio 
group/self falls below 0.47 or exceeds 0.77. These results are consistent with previous research 
using split-sample designs to examine subject group effects in public good provision 
experiments, and provide additional evidence that participants bring different motives into 
experimental settings (Ledyard, 1995). From the perspective of this paper, these results in the ­
"controlled environment" of the laboratory further heighten the importance of identifying 
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respondent characteristics and preferences that may affect actual participation levels in field 
experiments. 
S. Discussion and Conclusions 
Green pricing programs have come under substantial criticism in the electric utility 
industry because of their cost and poor customer participation. Our field experiment shows that 
customers who are made fully aware of a green pricing program, and who face a provision point 
mechanism, participate at a relatively high rate (between 16 and 20 percent). The two completed 
programs in which provision points were utilized succeeded in funding local projects with 
relatively high levels of participation. Further, our laboratory examination of the NMPC 
mechanism found that it approached demand revelation both at the aggregate and individual 
level. These results suggest that the disappointing sign-up rates of most green pricing programs 
to date could well be due to free riding associated with mechanism design, as well as to the 
problem of limited customer awareness. It should be noted that it is difficult, time consuming, 
and expensive to raise customer awareness for new programs such as GreenChoice™. However, 
employing a provision point mechanism is a relatively costless way to increase participation. On 
a practical note, economists should recognize the large impediment that consumer awareness 
plays for the private provision of public goods. Our results suggest that the NMPC program may 
well have failed simply because the company was unable to expend sufficient resources to 
effectively market a statewide program. The successful provision point programs in Traverse 
City and Fort Collins funded local rather than statewide projects, so, given the high profile nature 
of wind energy projects, awareness was easily achieved. Finally, this research suggests that, 
where large groups are involved, provision point mechanisms may fulfill the objective of 
privately funding public goods. 
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APPENDIX A: Sample Subject Instructions for the Laboratory Experiment 
Subject Number __ 
PRINT your Name and Social Security Number so that we can pay you 
Name =--_~""=""='_~ _ 
Social Security Number _ 
INSTRUCTIONS 
First, please write your subject number on the front of the envelope you have been given. 
You have been given the envelope to insure confidentiality. 
This is an experiment in the economics of decision making. If you follow the instructions 
closely and make decisions carefully, you can earn money. Please do not communicate with any 
other students during the experiment. If you have any questions please do not hesitate to raise your 
hand so that someone can come over and answer your questions individually. 
In this experiment all participants are given a starting balance of $5, which is yours to keep or 
use any way you like. At the end of these instructions, all of you will be asked if you want to join a 
group investment program for a one-time fee of $3. The exact amount of money that you will 
earn in the experiment depends on your answer to this investment question, as well as on the 
answers of ALL the other participants in your group. At the end of the experiment, your 
earnings will be calculated and you will be paid in cash. 
Once you understand the group investment program and how your earnings will be 
calculated, your task is to decide whether or not you want to join the group investment program for 
a fixed fee of $3. 
The group investment program works as follows. You are a member of a group of 100 
people in this class. The program will only be funded and implemented if at least 40 of the 100 
participants in your group join the investment program. If enough participants join the investment 
program so that the program is implemented, the return on the investment will be SHARED BY 
ALL participants in the experiment, investors and non-investors alike. Specifically, regardless 
of whether or not you have joined the group investment program, if enough people join, you 
will receive a return of $5.50. You will also receive a bonus payment of 3¢ for each participant 
that joins in excess of the minimum number of 40 necessary for the group program to be 
implemented. Furthermore, you keep your initial credit of $5 from which $3 will be deducted if • 
you decide to join the investment program. Note that other participants may have a different 
return but do not have a different bonus. 
29
 
If not enough participants join the investment program, the program will not be funded and 
will be canceled. In this case all the $3 fees collected will be refunded to those who joined. Thus, 
regardless of your decision to join the program or not, you would keep your $5 starting balance. 
To Summarize: 
- You must decide whether or not to join a group investment program for a cost of $3. 
- If fewer than 40 participants out of 100 join, the program will be canceled and all $3 fees will be 
refunded. 
- If 40 or more participants join, the program will be implemented and you will receive a return of 
$5.50 plus a bonus of 3¢ for each household that joins above 40. 
- Recall, that you do not need to join to receive your payment from the investment program if 40 or 
more other participants join. 
- But if you do join, you must pay the $3 fee. 
This is the end of the instructions. If you have any questions please raise your hand. 
THE QUESTION 
Do you want to join the group investment program for a fixed fee of $3?
 
(Circle one only)
 
YES I wish to join 
NO I do not wish to join 
Please place this sheet in the envelope provided and seal it. When everyone has sealed their
 
envelope, you will each be handed another sheet of questions. You must complete these
 
additional questions in order to get paid.
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APPENDIX B: Follow Up Questions for Laboratory Experiment 
TO BE PAID, YOU MUST COMPLETE THESE QUESTIONS 
Please enter your Subject Number from your envelope _ 
PRINT your Name and Social Security Number as you did before 
~Name 
--------------­Social Security Number	 _ 
(1)	 Do you think that enough people joined to fund the group investment program? 
(Circle one answer) 
I
I
 
!
 
YES NO 
(la) More precisely, how many people do you think joined--excluding yourself? 
(2)	 On a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 is not important and 7 is extremely important, 
how important were the following in your decision? 
i
I
I 
"
 
I
 
2a. I wanted to make as much money as I could for myself. (Circle one number) 
2
 3
 4
 5
 76 
Not Important Extremely important 
2b. I wanted the group to make as much money as possible. (Circle one number) 
t
I
I, 
I
I
I
I
I
I 
1 2
 3
 4
 5
 6
 7
 
Not Important	 Extremely important 
-
.. 
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1. We wish to thank the National Science Foundation, the Environmental Protection Agency, 
and Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation as sponsors of this research. Specifically, we wish to 
acknowledge Theresa Flaim, Janet Dougherty, Mike Kelleher, Pam Ingersoll, and Maria Ucchino 
at Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation. In addition, we benefitted from valuable comments 
from presentation discussants Martin Sefton and Andrew Platinga. 
2. The authors are, respectively: Research Assistant, Department of Agricultural, Resource, and 
Managerial Economics (ARME), Cornell University; Visiting Assistant Professor, Department of 
Economics, University of British Columbia; Assistant Professor, ARME, Cornell University; 
Research Assistant, Department of Economics, Cornell University; and Robinson Professor, 
ARME, Cornell University. 
3. See Baugh et al. (1995) for a detailed discussion of Green Pricing programs. 
4. In a series of papers, Palfrey and Rosenthal (1984, 1988, and 1991) develop theoretical 
models of contributions to public goods when individuals face the binary choice of contributing 
either a posted price or nothing. Unfortunately, the complex environment under consideration in 
our experiment (a large group, heterogeneous valuations, and incomplete information about 
others' preferences) precludes a direct test of this theory. Note that Palfrey and Rosenthal analyze 
environments with homogeneous values, so demand revelation is not an issue. 
4. In designing this program, NMPC asked William Schulze to suggest mechanisms to reduce 
free riding in green pricing programs (Schulze, 1994). 
6. The survey instrument followed the Dillman Total Design Method for telephone surveys 
(Dillman, 1978) which is designed to achieve a high overall response rate by keeping text blocks 
short and clear and by engaging the respondent with frequent questions throughout the survey. 
The response rate was just under 70%. The survey was pretested by administering successive 
draft versions by phone until respondents clearly understood the instrument. Hagler Bailly 
Consulting, Inc. was contracted to' administer the survey. Prior to telephone contact, potential 
respondents were sent a hand-signed cover letter on Cornell University stationery. The letter 
informed them that they had been selected as one of a small sample of customers to participate in 
the study of a new type of environmental program. It identified the study's sponsors as the 
National Science Foundation and the Environmental Protection Agency, together with NMPC, 
and enclosed a two dollar bill as a token of appreciation for participation. The two dollar bill has 
been found to be cost effective in increasing response rates. 
7. Households were classified as "unable to contact" based on a minimum of eight attempts. 
8. Respondents were also asked how they viewed the program in comparison with other causes 
they might support "like the United Way, public television, or environmental groups, " using a 
scale of one ("much less favorably") to 10 ("much more favorably") as a means of consolidating 
their preferences immediately prior to answering the participation question. Responses to this 
question are not included here, as they are a statistically significant function of the type of the 
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-project as well as the mechanism attributes. 
8. In the linear random utility model used in this analysis, income cancels out of the equation 
(Hanemann, 1984) and is thus not included here. 
10. This contribution figure is based on 84 valid VCM observations from the same 100 students. 
The 16 invalid observations were due to computer malfunction, student absence, or untraceable 
student information data. 
11. Only 98 observations are reported in Table 2, due to the fact that two respondents had 
missing values for various parts of the questionnaire. 
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